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Abstract
This study examines the coevolution of trust and legal institutions in a model of
competitive credit markets plagued by asymmetric information. When entrepreneurs’
relative payoﬀ to productive activities versus cheating is private information, uncivic
ones, who intend to cheat, can enter credit markets and be cross-subsidized by civic ones,
who engage in productive activities. To exploit this benefit, uncivic entrepreneurs de-
mand weak legal enforcement through the political process. This rent-seeking behavior
interacts with the formation of trust, generating an underdevelopment trap with weak
enforcement and distrust. Technological advancement may encourage entrepreneurs’
rent-seeking and aggravate distrust.
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1 Introduction
Informational frictions cause dysfunctional credit markets and hinder economic prosperity.
Given the severity of this issue, many empirical studies have attempted to identify the
determinants of well-functioning credit markets. On the one hand, following La Porta et
al. (1998), the literature emphasizes the influence of legal systems that enhance creditors’
ability to seize collateral on credit market development.1 On the other hand, Guiso et al.
(2004) demonstrate that trust, namely the faith that borrowers do not cheat based on their
embedded civic values, encourages the supply of credit and that the eﬀect of trust on the
availability of financial contracts is larger in areas where legal institutions are weaker.
Despite the potential benefit of either strengthening the legal protection of creditors or
cultivating trust, less developed economies fail to do both; the quality of institutions is
positively associated with measures of trust, as shown among countries (Algan and Cahuc,
2014, Tables 2.6a), in European regions (Tabellini, 2008a), and in Italian provinces (Guiso
et al., 2004). Why have some economies become trapped in a state of underdevelopment
with weak institutions and distrust?
To better understand this issue, we examine how institutions and trust coevolve in a
model of competitive credit markets plagued by asymmetric information. The presence of
asymmetric information induces uncivic entrepreneurs intending to cheat to demand weak
legal enforcement and secure their rents at the expense of other productive entrepreneurs.
This rent-seeking behavior interacts with the formation of trust, leading to multiple steady
states with diﬀerent levels of institutional quality, trust, and aggregate output. We then
show that the impact of technological improvement on an underdeveloped economy may be
dampened owing to uncivic entrepreneurs’ rent-seeking.
To show these results formally, we model credit markets in which entrepreneurs borrow
funds and then decide secretly whether to invest the borrowed funds in a project (productive
activity) or divert them to personal use (unproductive activity). Entrepreneurs diﬀer only in
1See Djankov et al. (2007) and Besley et al. (2012).
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terms of their own civic values, which are private information. Civic entrepreneurs feel guilty
for cheating, so that they are more attracted to investing in a project. By contrast, uncivic
entrepreneurs prefer cheating to investing. Thus, in equilibrium, only civic entrepreneurs
show productive entrepreneurial activity, thereby motivating us to measure the level of trust
in the economy as the proportion of civic entrepreneurs.
The key institutional factor determined in the political process is the quality of the en-
forcement of the collateral that entrepreneurs pledge. Stronger enforcement increases the
possibility that lenders seize collateral after default. If entrepreneurs’ civic value is ob-
servable so that uncivic entrepreneurs are driven out of credit markets, there is no conflict
of interests among entrepreneurs over the quality of enforcement. A suﬃcient quality of
enforcement for productive entrepreneurial activity always receives political support. How-
ever, if entrepreneurs’ value is unobservable, over-lending arises in equilibrium as in de Meza
and Webb (1987), where financial contracts force civic entrepreneurs to cross-subsidize un-
civic ones.2 This cross-subsidization generates conflicts of interest between civic and un-
civic entrepreneurs over the quality of enforcement; while strong enforcement is detrimental
to uncivic entrepreneurs, it benefits civic entrepreneurs by lowering the degree of cross-
subsidization. Thus, under a majority voting system, enforcement quality depends on the
proportion of civic entrepreneurs. A high-trust economy in which civic entrepreneurs are
widely dominant chooses the strongest enforcement. By contrast, a low-trust economy in
which uncivic entrepreneurs are widely dominant chooses the weakest enforcement condi-
tional on being funded, which implies that the equilibrium level of enforcement depends on
entrepreneurs’ ability to raise funds.
The political conflicts caused by credit market frictions interact with the formation of
trust, when entrepreneurs’ civic values are endogenously determined through parental ed-
ucation. Following Bisin and Verdier (2001) and Tabellini (2008b), we assume imperfect
empathy: although parents care about the utilities of their children, they evaluate their
2In terms of modeling asymmetric information, our study is also related to Bester (1985, 1987), Besanko
and Thakor (1987), and Martin (2009).
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children’s behavior based on their own values. Such an approach implies that parents exert
costly educational eﬀort to instill their own values and this eﬀort choice is influenced by the
future circumstances of their children. This modeling generates complementarity between
values and enforcement, leading to multiple steady states. If parents anticipate strong en-
forcement in the child’s generation, they exert educational eﬀort to make their children civic.
That economy comprises a large proportion of civic children and thus will realize strong en-
forcement, meaning that the initial beliefs are justified. This steady state is characterized
by a high level of trust, strong enforcement, and high aggregate output. If, instead, parents
anticipate weak enforcement in the next generation, it discourages their incentives to exert
civic education. The resulting economy is then composed of a large proportion of uncivic
children and thus will lead to weak enforcement, implying that the initial expectations are
again justified. This steady state features a low level of trust, weak enforcement, and low
aggregate output.
An important mechanism of our model to generate an underdevelopment trap is that in
a world with adverse selection, entrepreneurs who spend resources on unproductive activi-
ties attempt to lower institutional quality to secure their rents at the expense of productive
entrepreneurs. This mechanism draws on the idea of Baumol (1990), which argues that
entrepreneurs’ rent-seeking activities can become pervasive and hinder economic develop-
ment.3 We extend this idea to argue that entrepreneurs’ rent-seeking behavior influences the
formation of trust and credit market development.
This underlying mechanism of our model further derives two novel insights. First, al-
though there is complementarity between trust and enforcement in the long run, they may be
substitutes in the short run. During the transitional path on which uncivic entrepreneurs re-
tain political power, higher trust improves contractual terms and benefits civic entrepreneurs,
leading uncivic ones to exploit the benefits and weaken enforcement further. Second, the
positive impact of technological improvement that enhances the profitability of productive
3Murphy et al. (1991) provides a formal model to investigate the implication of rent-seeking behavior for
economic development.
4
activities may be dampened because it induces uncivic entrepreneurs to exploit the benefits
and weaken enforcement, which discourages parental education and the formation of trust.
This negative eﬀect of technological change may help explain why even though ideas and
knowledge can spread so rapidly that any country has access to the innovations developed
in advanced countries, some economies have been trapped in a state of underdevelopment.
A vast body of research has recognized the importance of civic values and trust in de-
termining economic performance.4 Following the seminal work of Bisin and Verdier (2001),
the theoretical works in this field have focused on the cultural transmission of values, such
as those regarding trustworthiness (Francois and Zabojnik, 2005) and corruption (Hauk and
Saez-Marti, 2002).5 In contrast to these studies, we treat institutions as endogenous to study
their interactions with trust.
Our study also contributes to an extensive literature that has studied the political econ-
omy of formal institutions and financial development.6 Our emphasis on the eﬀect of credit
market frictions on institutional reform is in line with Aney et al. (2016), who show that
the presence of adverse selection hinders the government from selecting surplus-maximizing
policies. A key diﬀerence is that in our study, the resulting political failure interacts with
cultural transmission and could have long-lasting negative consequences on the economy.
Like our study, Ševčík (2012) and Matsuoka et al. (forthcoming) analyze the dynamics of le-
gal protection for creditors and economic development. However, while they focus on capital
accumulation, our emphasis is placed on the evolution of civic values.
There is a recent burgeoning literature on the coevolution of culture and formal institu-
tions.7 Such an interplay is analyzed in a variety of contexts, including between cooperation
4See Putnam (1993), Fukuyama (1995), Knack and Keefer (1997), La Porta et al. (1997), Algan and
Cahuc (2010), and Tabellini (2010).
5Kumar and Matsusaka (2009) develop an alternative model with which to study cultural evolution and
the development process, in which they distinguish social capital that relies on personal networks from social
capital useful for enforcing contracts with strangers.
6See Rajan and Zingales (2003), Pagano and Volpin (2005, 2006), Perotti and von Thadden (2006), and
Biais and Mariotti (2009).
7See Alesina and Giuliano (2015) for an excellent survey and Bisin and Verdier (2017) for a theoretical
analysis in the general setup.
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and legal institutions that enhance cooperation (Tabellini, 2008b), between the culture of
work and redistribution policies (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005 and Bénabou and Tirole, 2006),
between honesty norms and institutions that encourage trading (Bidner and Francois, 2011),
and between cultural values and labor market institutions (Aghion et al., 2011, Michau, 2013
and Alesina et al., 2015). The most closely related works to our interests are Aghion et al.
(2010) and Carlin et al. (2009), which focus on the coevolution of trust and government reg-
ulation. In Aghion et al. (2010), trust and entry regulation are substitutes because low-trust
economies demand entry regulation to prevent uncivic entrepreneurs from imposing a nega-
tive externality, whereas under strong regulation entrepreneurs become uncivic to pay bribes
and enter the market. Carlin et al. (2009) place financial markets at the center and show
that whether trust and regulation are substitutes or complements depends on the value of
social capital. The diﬀerence from these works is that in our study, the relationship between
trust and enforcement changes depending on the timespan; they may be substitutes in the
short run but they are complements in the long run. Moreover, our model sheds light on the
mechanism through which technological change influences institutional quality and trust.
Outline: The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the frame-
work of the static model in which civic values are exogenous. Section 3 analyzes the equilib-
rium of the static model and shows the one-way eﬀect of trust on the quality of enforcement.
Section 4 extends the model to the dynamic setting in which civic values are endogenously
determined through parental education. The dynamic economy describes the divergence in
development through the two-way eﬀects between trust and enforcement. Section 5 con-
cludes.
2 The Static Model
In this section, we describe the basic framework of the static model in which civic values are
exogenously given, whereas the level of enforcement is an endogenous variable.
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There is a continuum of measure one of entrepreneurs and lenders. Both agents are
risk-neutral and consume at the end of the period. Entrepreneurs are protected by limited
liabilities.8 Each entrepreneur has a project requiring a fixed investment I > 0. The project
produces cash flows R > 0 with probability p 2 (0; 1] and nothing with probability 1   p.
Entrepreneurs have no funds and thus need to rely on external financing to run their projects.
Lenders are deep-pocketed and willing to provide funds perfectly elastically at a fixed interest
rate, which is normalized to zero.
Each entrepreneur is born with illiquid wealth C > 0, which can be consumed only at
the end of the period. Although this wealth cannot be transformed into cash, entrepreneurs
can pledge it as collateral in the case of default. However, the pledge is enforced imperfectly:
collateral is seized with probability  2 [0; 1] and is left to the entrepreneur with probability
1    . We interpret probability  as a measure of institutional quality, with a higher value
corresponding to better-quality institutions. The idea behind this interpretation is that the
power of creditors against defaulting borrowers strengthens because of laws that improve
creditor rights and their enforcement.  is an endogenous variable and is selected by the
simple majority rule before financial contracts are signed. In the political process, each agent
votes on  that maximizes his or her expected payoﬀ and the voting decision is unobservable.
We assume that  can change without any cost to focus on its eﬀect on financial contracts.
There is a moral hazard problem for entrepreneurs. After borrowing funds, each en-
trepreneur chooses either to invest them in projects or to steal them to consume. We assume
that entrepreneurs who choose to cheat must default and lenders cannot distinguish default
from cheating and that from project failure.
Entrepreneurs diﬀer by their civic values, which aﬀect their choice between investing and
cheating. There are two types of entrepreneurs, denoted by i 2 fG;Bg, which corresponds
to good (or civic) types and bad (or uncivic) types, respectively. When investing, the en-
trepreneur of type i incurs a psychological eﬀort cost, i, with B > G. For simplicity, we
8We assume that the legal rules about limited liability cannot be changed in the political process.
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set G = 0. When cheating, the entrepreneur of type i has a feeling of guilt and incurs a
psychological cost, i, with G > B > 0. The assumption B > 0 implies that cheating is
socially wasteful.
The proportion  2 (0; 1) of entrepreneurs are good types and 1    of those are bad
types. Each entrepreneur’s type is private information but  is common knowledge. While
we take  to be exogenously given in the static model, we allow  to evolve as a result of
family-led civic education in Section 4.9
All borrowing and lending are intermediated through banks. There are a finite number
of competitive, risk-neutral banks, which collect funds from lenders at the zero interest rate
and oﬀer entrepreneurs a menu of loan contracts. The loan contract specifies (i) that the
entrepreneur borrows I, (ii) that banks receive r and the entrepreneur receives R   r when
the investment succeeds, and (iii) that entrepreneurs pledge a proportion k 2 [0; 1] of their
wealth C as collateral that banks try to seize in the case of default. Thus, if financing is
secured, entrepreneurs of type i have the following net expected utility:10
U i =
8>><>>:
p(R  r)  (1  p)kC   i when investing,
bi   kC when cheating,
(1)
where bi  I   i denote the private benefit for an entrepreneur of type i from cheating,
with I > bB > bG. If financing is not secured, net utility is given by U i = 0.
To model credit market competition with adverse selection, we follow Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976) and consider the following two-stage game. In the first stage, banks design
a menu of loan contracts and, in the second stage, entrepreneurs choose at most one of the
contracts among those oﬀered. To focus on the symmetric equilibrium, we assume that when
9Even if we endogenize  in Section 4, we focus on the equilibrium path on which  is in the range (0; 1)
by making Assumption 5.
10The gross expected utility of entrepreneurs of type i, ~U i, is given by p(R r+C)+(1 p)(1 k)C i
in the case of investing and bi + (1  k)C in the case of cheating. After subtracting the consumption that
the entrepreneurs would obtain without financing from their gross utility, we obtain their net utility; that
is, U i = ~U i   C.
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more than one bank oﬀers the same contract, they obtain the same share and composition
of entrepreneurs that choose the contract and collect the same share of funds from lenders.
The timing of the events is as follows:
1. Each entrepreneur knows only his or her own type.
2. The quality of enforcement  is determined by majoritarian voting.
3. Banks design financial contracts (r; k), and then entrepreneurs apply for these con-
tracts.
4. Each entrepreneur who borrows funds chooses between investing them in a project and
stealing them.
5. Investment returns are realized, the realized outcome is shared as contracted, and
consumption takes place.
We make two parametric assumptions. The first assumption guarantees that while for
good entrepreneurs, running a project produces a positive value, for bad entrepreneurs, it
does not:
Assumption 1 pR > I > pR  B:
Under Assumption 1, the first-best allocation (the allocation in the economy without moral
hazard and adverse selection) is that good entrepreneurs make investment, whereas bad
entrepreneurs do not.
The second assumption ensures that bad entrepreneurs find it beneficial to cheat even in
the perfect enforcement case:
Assumption 2 bB   C > 0:
Given bB = I   B, Assumption 2 implies that collateral is insuﬃcient to cover the cost
of investment (I > C) and repayment must be positive (r > 0). From (1) and Assump-
tion 1, Assumption 2 also implies that in the economy with any level of enforcement, bad
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entrepreneurs have an incentive to apply for loans and choose to cheat rather than to invest.
This means that in equilibrium, only good entrepreneurs invest funds in projects. When
we define trust in this economy as banks’ beliefs about the probability that an entrepreneur
invests funds in projects,11 our measure of trust is consistent with the share of good en-
trepreneurs . Therefore, hereafter, we refer to  as the level of trust. We discuss the role
of Assumption 2 in our model further at the end of Section 3.3.
Finally, we define an equilibrium. Our equilibrium concept is based on the perfect
Bayesian equilibrium, requiring (i) that each agent’s decisions are optimal, where enforce-
ment  and other agents’ strategies and beliefs are taken as given, (ii) that agents’ beliefs
are consistent with Bayes’ rule given the equilibrium strategies, whenever possible, and (iii)
that the strength of enforcement  is determined by majoritarian voting.
3 Analysis of the Static Model
This section analyzes the equilibrium of the static model. First, as a benchmark case, con-
sider that entrepreneurs’ type is observable in Section 3.1. Then, Section 3.2 characterizes the
optimal financial contract in the presence of adverse selection. Section 3.3 investigates how
the level of trust aﬀects the quality of enforcement through the political process. Section 3.4
examines the comparative statics.
3.1 Credit markets without adverse selection
In this section, we consider the situation in which entrepreneurs’ type is observable. Since
banks behave competitively in loan markets, they design a financial contract that maxi-
mizes the payoﬀ of entrepreneurs of type i and provides a non-negative payoﬀ for banks
11This definition is consistent with Gambetta’s (2000) definition of trust. Gambetta (2000) defines trust as
“the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a
particular action” and states that “when we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly
mean that the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us
is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him.”
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and the entrepreneurs. On the one hand, financing for bad entrepreneurs does not occur
because a negative surplus arises either from investments in a project (pR   I   B < 0
from Assumption 1) or from cheating (B > 0). On the other hand, for good entrepreneurs,
financial contracts that provide them with incentives to invest are oﬀered because if a good
entrepreneur chooses cheating, yielding a negative surplus (G > 0), either the good en-
trepreneur or the bank must lose money in expectation.
Formally, given the strength of enforcement  , the optimal financial contract for good
entrepreneurs is characterized as the solution of the following problem: choosing (r; k) to
maximize
UG = p(R  r)  (1  p)kC (2)
subject to
p(R  r)  (1  p)kC  bG   kC; (3)
p(R  r)  (1  p)kC  0; (4)
pr + (1  p)kC  I: (5)
The objective function (2) is the good entrepreneur’s net expected payoﬀ from (1). (3) is
the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint, which requires that investing yields a higher
payoﬀ for good entrepreneurs than cheating. (4) and (5) are the individual rationality (IR)
constraint for good entrepreneurs and the one for banks, respectively.
Since (5) is binding and banks break even, good entrepreneurs who borrow funds receive
payoﬀ pR   I, equivalent to the entire surplus of the project, and (4) is slack. Thus, any
financial contract (r; k) that satisfies (5) with equality, the feasibility constraint, k 2 [0; 1],
and (3) is indiﬀerent to good entrepreneurs. Given that a higher k relaxes (3), financing
11
actually occurs if
pR  bG| {z }
pledgeable income
+ C|{z}
collateral
 I: (6)
(6) means that when the sum of pledgeable income and collateral value exceeds the cost of
financing, good entrepreneurs can obtain financing. This condition implies that if only the
pledgeable income can cover the cost of financing (i.e., pR   bG  I), pledging collateral is
unnecessary; loan contracts that specify k = 0 can be oﬀered. However, if pR   bG < I,
collateral is necessary to compensate for a lack of pledgeable income. In this case, good
entrepreneurs obtain financing by pledging some amount of collateral (k > 0).
Anticipating these financial contracts, agents vote on the strength of enforcement  .
Each agent votes for  that gives him or her the highest level of utility based on his or
her preference. We assume that if some values of  give agents the highest payoﬀ, they
randomize their choices. Lenders and bad entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent to any  because
lenders earn zero profit and bad entrepreneurs obtain no financing, regardless of  . For good
entrepreneurs, the desirable level of enforcement depends on the degree of pledgeability. If the
pledgeable income is high such that collateral is unnecessary to secure financing (pR  bG 
I), any level of  gives good entrepreneurs payoﬀ pR I. If the pledgeable income is low such
that collateral is necessary (pR  bG < I  pR  bG +C), they obtain payoﬀ pR  I as long
as   I pR+bG
C
; when  < I pR+b
G
C
, they cannot obtain financing. Thus, if collateral does
not matter, any level of  is politically feasible, and if collateral matters, any   I pR+bG
C
can be realized based on the demand from good entrepreneurs.
Proposition 1 Suppose that entrepreneurs’ type is observable and that Assumption 1 holds.
Assume pR bG+C  I. The level of enforcement takes any value in
h
max
n
0; I pR+b
G
C
o
; 1
i
.
While good entrepreneurs invest in projects and receive their payoﬀ UG = pR   I, bad
entrepreneurs obtain no financing and receive their payoﬀ UB = 0.
Let us conclude the analysis of this section with two remarks. First, collateral matters
because it makes up for the limited pledgeable income caused by the moral hazard problem.
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Second, in the stage of voting on the strength of enforcement, there is no conflict of interests
between good and bad entrepreneurs. The political decision reflects only the preferences of
good entrepreneurs, who demand a certain level of enforcement to secure financing. In the
following sections, we show that when entrepreneurs’ type is unobservable, collateral plays
a role in reducing the cost of cross-subsidization, leading to a conflict of interests between
good and bad entrepreneurs over the strength of enforcement.
3.2 Credit markets with adverse selection
Now, suppose that entrepreneurs’ type is their private information. Given the level of trust
 and enforcement quality  , banks design loan contracts. We first can show that there is
no separating equilibrium. If a separating equilibrium exists, only good entrepreneurs must
obtain financing because the investment undertaken by good (bad) entrepreneurs yields
a positive (negative) surplus from Assumption 1. However, from Assumption 2, bad en-
trepreneurs have incentives to pretend to be the good type and engage in cheating, which
gives them a higher payoﬀ than a payoﬀ with no financing.
We then focus on a pooling equilibrium. An equilibrium pooling contract needs to satisfy
the IC constraint (3), the IR constraint for good entrepreneurs (4), and the IR constraint
for banks:
pr + (1  p)kC  I; (7)
which is diﬀerent from (5) because banks cannot distinguish good and bad entrepreneurs.
From Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, bad entrepreneurs always engage in cheating and earn
a positive payoﬀ, UB = bB   C > 0, making their IR constraint slacking. Because banks
compete to attract good entrepreneurs, the equilibrium pooling contract is characterized as
the solution of the problem that chooses (r; k) to maximize good entrepreneurs’ payoﬀ (2)
subject to the constraints (3), (4), and (7).
Given that (7) is binding and banks earn zero profit, good entrepreneurs prefer contracts
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that require more collateral (higher k) and smaller repayments (lower r) because pledging
collateral is less costly to good entrepreneurs, who have a lower probability of default, com-
pared with bad ones, and reduces the cost of cross-subsidization. Thus, equilibrium contracts
require that collateral is fully pledged, k = 1, and repayment r is determined by (7) satisfied
with equality.
Financing occurs if the remaining two constraints are satisfied. The first constraint (3)
becomes

 
pR  bG+ C  I; (8)
which requires that the sum of the expected pledgeable income provided by good entrepreneurs
and the collateral value is larger than the cost of financing. Compared with the con-
straint without adverse selection (6), (8) is more restrictive because the presence of bad
entrepreneurs reduces the expected pledgeable income. The second constraint (4) can be
rewritten as
UG = pR  I   1  

(I   C)| {z }
cost of adverse selection
 0; (9)
which implies that good entrepreneurs’ payoﬀ is increasing in  and can be negative. A lower
 increases the cost of cross-subsidizing bad entrepreneurs and may drive good ones out of
credit markets.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium financial contract.
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1–2 hold. If  is high such that   () for any
  , where
() 
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
I   pR
C(1  ) if  
I   bG
pR  bG ,
I   (pR  bG)
C
if
I   bG
pR  bG <  
I
pR  bG ,
0 if
I
pR  bG < ,
(10)
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⌧Financing
I   C
pR  bG
I   C
pR  C
I   bG
pR  bG
I
pR  bG
I/C
1
1
bG/C
 
I    (pR  bG)
C
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Figure 1: Financing conditions
and
  max

I   C
pR  C ;
I   C
pR  bG

> 0; (11)
then both types of entrepreneurs obtain financing by applying for a pooling contract:
(r; k) =

I   (1  p)C
p
; 1

; (12)
Otherwise, no financing occurs.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 shows that financing occurs only in the shaded region in Figure 1. If
the level of trust  is lower than the threshold , either (8) or (9) must be violated for
any  , leading to the breakdown of credit markets. If  is above the threshold , pooling
contracts can be oﬀered depending on the strength of enforcement  . When  is low such
that   I bG
pR bG , the cost of cross-subsidizing bad entrepreneurs is so high that it is more
diﬃcult to satisfy good entrepreneurs’ IR constraint (9) than their IC constraint (8). This
implies that for   (), where () is determined by (9) holding as an equality, financing
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occurs. When  is high such that  > I bG
pR bG , it is more diﬃcult to provide good entrepreneurs
with incentives to invest and satisfy the IC constraint (8) than to meet their IR constraint
(9). In this case, the threshold () is determined by (8) holding as an equality, and for
any  above the threshold, entrepreneurs obtain financing. Although the binding constraint
changes depending on , a higher  relaxes both constraints (8) and (9) further, decreasing
the lower bound of enforcement quality (). If  exceeds a certain level, I
pR bG , then the
threshold reaches the lowest level 0.
Proposition 2 highlights several diﬀerences from the situation without adverse selection.
First, bad entrepreneurs can obtain financing and their cheating reduces the social surplus; in
other words, over-lending arises as in de Meza and Webb (1987). Second, pledging collateral
matters because it reduces the cost of adverse selection. This eﬀect leads to the equilibrium
contract that requires entrepreneurs to pledge the full amount of collateral (k = 1). Third,
the required level of enforcement to secure financing can be higher because the possibility that
bad entrepreneurs obtain financing decreases the expected pledgeable income and aggravates
the moral hazard problem. Fourth, as Guiso et al. (2004) emphasize, the level of trust aﬀects
financial development. A certain level of trust (i.e.,   ) is necessary to sustain the working
of credit markets, and a higher  reduces the cost of financing (captured by a decrease in
repayment r). Moreover, the eﬀect of higher trust on the cost of financing is larger in an
economy with weaker enforcement (i.e., @2r
@@
> 0). In the next section, we show that despite
the large potential benefit of strengthening enforcement, the low-trust economy does not
increase  in the equilibrium.
3.3 The equilibrium quality of enforcement
Given the level of trust , the strength of enforcement  is determined by majoritarian
voting. While lenders earn zero profit for any  , a conflict of interests between diﬀerent
types of entrepreneurs over  emerges due to adverse selection.
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On the one hand, from (9), good entrepreneurs’ policy preferences are given by
UG =
8><>:
pR  I

+
1  

C if    and   (),
0 otherwise.
(13)
They receive a higher payoﬀ when they obtain financing than when they do not, and condi-
tional on financing, they prefer a higher  because stronger enforcement reduces the degree
of cross-subsidization. This means that the perfect level of enforcement,  = 1, maximizes
good entrepreneurs’ payoﬀ (13) if   . On the other hand, bad entrepreneurs’ policy
preferences are given by
UB =
8>><>>:
bB   C if    and   (),
0 otherwise.
(14)
They prefer being funded to not being funded, as with good entrepreneurs. However, condi-
tional on financing, bad entrepreneurs prefer a lower  because weaker enforcement decreases
the probability of losing collateral after cheating. As a result, if   , the lowest level of
enforcement,  = (), maximizes bad entrepreneurs’ payoﬀ (14).
The equilibrium level of enforcement depends on the proportion of good entrepreneurs
, as shown in Figure 2. When  > maxf1=2; g, good entrepreneurs are in the majority,
and  = 1 is selected according to their preferences (13). Thus, we refer to the situation
in which good entrepreneurs become the majority as the strong enforcement regime. When
    1=2, bad entrepreneurs are in the majority, and  = () is chosen according
to their preferences (14).12 We call the situation that bad entrepreneurs constitute the
majority the weak enforcement regime. When  < ,  is indeterminate and does not aﬀect
the equilibrium outcome because no financing is inevitable.
12We assume that when  = 1=2, bad entrepreneurs have the political power to determine  . This
assumption does not change our conclusion.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium level of enforcement
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumptions 1–2 hold. If  > maxf1=2; g, the equilibrium
level of enforcement is given by  = 1. If     1=2, then it is  = () given by (10).
Otherwise, the equilibrium level of enforcement takes any value in [0; 1].
Proposition 3 exhibits the non-linear relationship between the level of trust and quality
of enforcement. When the level of trust is low, a higher level of trust enhances entrepreneurs’
ability to secure financing and thus allows bad entrepreneurs to weaken enforcement. How-
ever, once the economy cultivates trust up to a certain level, good entrepreneurs obtain
political power and set strong enforcement.
Discussion of Assumption 2: If Assumption 2 is violated and the collateral value is high
such that C > bB, the separating equilibrium emerges for  > bB=C; with a suﬃciently high
level of enforcement, cheating is not attractive for bad entrepreneurs and they choose to exit
the credit markets. In this case, the issue of cross-subsidization is resolved, and so good
entrepreneurs can receive loan contracts that give them the entire surplus pR   I as in the
situation without adverse selection. This implies that when   1=2, good entrepreneurs
support strong enforcement that satisfies  > bB=C, and the resulting economy is free from
the eﬀect of adverse selection. Perhaps more surprisingly, the same thing happens when
 is suﬃciently low that the pooling equilibrium does not exist for any  . Because bad
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Figure 3: Comparative statics in the static model
entrepreneurs do not obtain financing regardless of  , the political decision reflects only the
preferences of good entrepreneurs, who demand strong enforcement to allow for the separat-
ing equilibrium ( > bB=C). Thus, while the economy achieves the first-best allocation in a
low- or a high-trust economy, over-lending takes place in the case of an intermediate level of
trust.
3.4 Comparative statics
First, we consider the eﬀect of technological advancements captured by an increase in project
return R.13 This eﬀect is shown in Figure 3a. A higher R not only raises the good en-
trepreneur’s payoﬀ, which relaxes (9), but also increases the pledgeable income, which relaxes
(8). As a result, these eﬀects enhance entrepreneurs’ ability to attract funds. However, the
beneficial eﬀects on good entrepreneurs can be exploited by bad entrepreneurs through the
political process. In the weak enforcement regime, the increase in R weakens enforcement
and benefits bad entrepreneurs.
13An increase in p and a decrease in I are also interpreted as technological progress. These changes have
the same eﬀect as an increase in R.
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Next, we consider an increase in the feeling of guilt from cheating G or a decrease in bG.
This captures the eﬀect of public education, which plays an important role in nurturing civic
virtues. As shown in Figure 3b, while a lower bG does not directly aﬀect good entrepreneurs’
payoﬀ, it discourages them from cheating and relaxes (8). This implies that if the economy is
under the weak enforcement regime and (8) is binding before the change in bG ( I bG
pR bG <  
1
2
), the equilibrium level of enforcement decreases after the change because bad entrepreneurs
understand that credit markets still work even if enforcement is further weakened.
4 Dynamics
We extend the static model developed in Section 2 into the dynamic setting by allowing
for intergenerational cultural transmission. Parents can influence the civic values of their
children, and through such parental education, the level of trust  evolves over time. Sec-
tion 4.1 describes the dynamic setting. Section 4.2 considers cultural transmission in the
benchmark case in which entrepreneurs’ type is observable. Section 4.3 analyzes parents’
incentives to educate their children when entrepreneurs’ type is unobservable. Section 4.4
shows that the complementarity between trust and enforcement leads to multiple steady
states. In contrast to the result of the static model, the level of trust is positively associated
with enforcement quality in the long run, which is consistent with the empirical regularity.
Section 4.5 characterizes the transitional dynamics, where trust and enforcement can be
substitutes. Section 4.6 studies the comparative statics.
4.1 Dynamic setting
Time is discrete, indexed by t = 0; 1; 2; : : : , and goes on forever. In every period, a continuum
of mass one of lenders and entrepreneurs are born. Lenders live for only one period, are born
with a suﬃciently large amount of funds, and provide them perfectly elastically at a fixed
interest rate 0. Entrepreneurs live for two periods (young and old). In each generation, one
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Figure 4: Time structure of the overlapping generations model
young entrepreneur is born from each old entrepreneur. Figure 4 shows the time structure.
Entrepreneurs form their own civic value when young. When they are old, there are two
phases: the working phase and retirement phase. During the working phase in period t,
entrepreneurs experience the same events as those in the static model of Section 2; they
receive illiquid wealth C, know their own type, vote on the level of enforcement t, apply
for financial contracts (rt; kt) oﬀered by banks, face moral hazard, and consume. We assume
that once wealth is consumed, it disappears. During the retirement phase in period t, each
old entrepreneur exerts costly educational eﬀort to instill civic values in his or her child
individually. An old entrepreneur with type i 2 fG;Bg can increase the probability that
the child becomes good by f it  0 by incurring the psychological cost 12 (f it )2 with  > 0.14
After receiving parental education, the young entrepreneur knows only his or her own type.
We assume that the level of educational eﬀort is unobservable.
Following Bisin and Verdier (2001) and Tabellini (2008b), we adopt the “imperfect em-
pathy” approach: parents are altruistic and take into account the utility of their children;
14If parents can increase the probability that their children become bad, namely f it can take negative values,
the proportion of good entrepreneurs can be smaller. However, the qualitative result does not change.
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however, they evaluate their children’s actions based on their own preferences. This ap-
proach reflects the idea that parents are paternalistic. Let U it 1 and V
ij
t denote the expected
net payoﬀ to type-i entrepreneurs of generation t  1 deriving from their own activity in the
working phase and the one deriving from the activity in the working phase of their type-j
children, respectively. The expected lifetime utility of a type-i entrepreneur of generation
t  1 is given by
U it 1 + ( + f
i
t 1)V
iG
t + (1     f it 1)V iBt  
(f it 1)
2
2
; (15)
where  2 (0; 1) is the probability that a good child is born naturally.
Let t denote the proportion of good entrepreneurs of generation t. Through parental
education, the proportion of good entrepreneurs evolves according to
t = t 1( + fGt 1) + (1  t 1)( + fBt 1); for any t > 0. (16)
Because of the law of large numbers, the measure t 1(+fGt 1) of type-G young entrepreneurs
are born from type-G old entrepreneurs and the measure (1 t 1)(+fBt 1) of type-G young
entrepreneurs are born from type-B old entrepreneurs. Given f it 1  0, (16) implies that
 is a minimum proportion of good entrepreneurs. We assume that an entrepreneur of the
initial generation (t = 0) becomes good with probability 0 and bad with probability with
1  0, where 0 is exogenously given and common knowledge.
We assume that banks have no information about the entrepreneurs of past generations,
so that banks cannot have beliefs about an entrepreneur’s type that depend on the dynasty.
This simplifies our analysis because all old entrepreneurs of generation t are the same from
banks’ perspective, and so they must believe that they provide funds to good entrepreneurs
with probability t and bad ones with probability 1   t. Thus, the payoﬀ-relevant state
variable is the level of trust t.
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4.2 Cultural transmission in credit markets without adverse selec-
tion
As a benchmark case, we analyze the evolution of trust when entrepreneurs’ type is ob-
servable. Because old entrepreneurs influence their children only through education, their
lifetime utility (15) implies that their decisions in the working phase are made independently
of their decisions in the retirement phase. This allows us to apply the result of Section 3.1
to this dynamic setting. As shown in Proposition 1, although the strength of enforcement t
can take any value in
h
max
n
0; I pR+b
G
C
o
; 1
i
, good entrepreneurs always invest in projects
and receive their payoﬀ UGt = pR   I, and bad entrepreneurs obtain no financing and earn
their payoﬀ UBt = 0.
Next, consider parental education. From (15), the parental optimization problem of a
type-i old entrepreneur becomes
max
f it 12[0;1 ]
( + f it 1)V
iG
t + (1     f it 1)V iBt  
(f it 1)
2
2
: (17)
When the child becomes good, the old entrepreneur’s payoﬀ depends on his or her type i
because of imperfect empathy, which induces him or her to evaluate the child’s action based
on his or her own values. While old entrepreneurs of type G receive the same utility as the
young, i.e., V GGt = UGt = pR   I, old entrepreneurs of type B consider that the investment
undertaken by their children entails the psychological cost B, i.e., V BGt = pR   I   B,
although their children actually do not incur such a cost. When the child becomes bad, both
types of old entrepreneurs receive a zero payoﬀ because bad entrepreneurs cannot obtain
financing: V GBt = V BBt = UBt = 0.
(17) implies that old entrepreneurs of type B do not have an incentive to educate their
children, that is, fBt 1 = 0 for any period because V BGt < V BBt from Assumption 1. By
contrast, old entrepreneurs of type G have an incentive to exert educational eﬀort because
V GGt > V
GB
t from Assumption 1. When the cost of education is suﬃciently large such that
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1 
 t
 t 1
45 
  +  t 1  (pR  I)
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Figure 5: Dynamics in credit markets without adverse selection
their optimal eﬀort level does not exceed 1  , it is given by
fGt 1 = (pR  I): (18)
By substituting fBt 1 = 0 and (18) into (16), we completely characterize the evolution of
trust: t =  + t 1(pR   I). As shown in Figure 5, there exists a unique globally stable
steady state.
Proposition 4 Suppose that entrepreneurs’ type is observable and that Assumption 1 holds.
If pR  bG+C  I and (pR I) < 1 , then there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium
where the level of trust is given by
1 =

1   (pR  I) : (19)
This unique steady-state equilibrium is globally stable, and starting from any 0 2 (0; 1), t
monotonically converges to 1.
24
4.3 Cultural transmission in credit markets with adverse selection
Next, we analyze cultural transmission when entrepreneurs’ type is private information.
Since all decisions during the working phase are made separately from parental education,
we can use the analysis of Section 3.2 and Section 3.3.
To simplify the following analysis, we make two assumptions. First, we assume
Assumption 3
 <  <
1
2
:
The right-hand side of Assumption 3 assures that given that  is the minimum proportion
of good entrepreneurs, bad entrepreneurs can constitute the majority. The left-hand side
of Assumption 3 guarantees that on the equilibrium path, financing necessarily occurs. If
 < , a steady state with t 1 = t =  always exists, where credit markets break down.
Since the presence of such a steady state complicates the analysis and does not change our
conclusion, we focus on the situation with   . The second assumption is that
Assumption 4
1
2
<
I
pR  bG :
This assumption guarantees that even under the weak enforcement regime, the equilibrium
level of enforcement is positive, namely t > 0 for any t. If Assumption 4 is violated, there
might exist multiple steady states under the weak enforcement regime. However, because
such multiplicity is outside our interest, we rule out that case.
Under Assumption 3 and Assumption 4, given the current state variable t  , the
equilibrium level of enforcement is
t = (t) =
8>><>>:
1 if
1
2
< t,
max

I   tpR
C(1  t) ;
I   t(pR  bG)
C

if
1
2
 t,
(20)
25
from (10) and Proposition 3, and the equilibrium contract is
(rt; kt) =

I   (1  tp)(t)C
tp
; 1

(21)
from Proposition 2. Correspondingly, the equilibrium payoﬀs of entrepreneurs with type
i 2 fG;Bg in the working phase are given by
UGt = pR 
I
t
+
1  t
t
(t)C; (22)
UBt = b
B   (t)C; (23)
where (22) and (23) are derived from (13) and (14), respectively.
Then, consider the parental education problem (17). When the type of a parent and a
child is the same (i.e., i = j), the parent receives the same utility as the child: V GGt = UGt
and V BBt = UBt . When the type of parent and child is diﬀerent (i.e., i 6= j), the idea of
imperfect empathy comes in:
V BGt = pR 
I
t
+
1  t
t
(t)C   B; (24)
V GBt = b
G   (t)C: (25)
(24) shows that bad parents consider that the investment undertaken by their good children
entails the psychological cost B. (25) shows that good parents consider cheating by their bad
children to be shameful conduct and evaluate the private benefits as bG but not the benefits
that their bad children indeed obtain bB. Thus, we have V GBt 6= V BBt , which contrasts with
the case without adverse selection (V GBt = V BBt = 0) because while no financing gives both
types of old entrepreneurs the same payoﬀ, cheating gives them diﬀerent payoﬀs depending
on their type.
We characterize the equilibrium level of educational eﬀort. To ensure that it does not
reach the upper bound, 1  , we assume
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Assumption 5
 <
1  
pR  bG   I + C :
This assumption guarantees that on the equilibrium path, the level of trust t is strictly
lower than one and adverse selection is not resolved completely.
Lemma 1 Suppose that Assumptions 1–5 hold. For old entrepreneurs of type B, the optimal
level of education is given by fBt 1 = 0 for any period. For old entrepreneurs of type G, it is
given by
fGt 1 =
8>><>>:
fs(t)  

pR  bG   I   C
t

if
1
2
< t,
fw(t)  max



I   tpR
1  t   b
G

; 0

if
1
2
 t,
(26)
where fs(t) is increasing in t and, if t < I b
G
pR bG , fw(t) is decreasing in t.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 1 suggests that in equilibrium, only old entrepreneurs of type G have incentives
to exert educational eﬀort. Thus, hereafter, we refer to them as just old entrepreneurs or
parents.
The optimal level of education (26) diﬀers from that without adverse selection (18) and
thus creates diﬀerent dynamics of trust. Without adverse selection, (18) indicates that the
eﬀort level is independent of parents’ expectations about the future level of trust t and the
corresponding level of enforcement t. With adverse selection, (26) indicates that the future
level of trust t not only directly influences the optimal level of education, but also indirectly
aﬀects it through a change in enforcement quality (t). The eﬀect from the future quality
of enforcement to the current educational choices generates the mechanism through which
the complementarity between trust and enforcement emerges.
From (26), when old entrepreneurs expect that t > 1=2, so that the strong enforcement
regime appears in the next period, there is cultural complementarity ; that is, the optimal level
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of education fs(t) is increasing in t. This means that old entrepreneurs have more incentive
to exert educational eﬀort as they anticipate that young entrepreneurs of type G will be more
dominant in the population. A higher t decreases the extent of cross-subsidization by good
entrepreneurs and raises their payoﬀ UGt and their good parents’ payoﬀ V GGt , encouraging
parental education.
(26) also indicates that when old entrepreneurs expect that t  1=2 and the weak
enforcement regime appears in the next period, there can be cultural substitution; that is, the
educational level fw(t) is decreasing in t if t < I b
G
pR bG . Because a higher t leads to weaker
enforcement, which benefits type-B children and hurts type-G children, old entrepreneurs
have less incentive to make educational eﬀort as they anticipate that type-G children will be
more dominant in the population. If t  I bGpR bG , an old entrepreneur is indiﬀerent between
having a type-G and a type-B child (V GGt = V GBt ) and thus fw(t) = 0.
4.4 Dynamic analysis: Steady states
Substituting fBt 1 = 0 and (26) into (16) yields the following evolution of trust.
Lemma 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1–5 hold. Given t  , t evolves according to
t =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 1(t 1) if
1
2
< t,

 1(t 1) if
1
2
 t and   t < I   b
G
pR  bG ,
 otherwise,
(27)
where
(t)  (t   )t
[t(pR  bG)  (I   C)] ; (28)

(t)  (t   )(1  t)
[I   bG   t(pR  bG)] : (29)
1. () = 0 and (1) > 1. For any t  , 0(t) > 0 and 00(t) < 0.
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(b)   I bG
pR bG
Figure 6: Multiple stable steady states
2. 
() = 0 and as t ! I bGpR bG , 
(t) ! 1. For any t 2
h
; I b
G
pR bG

, 
0(t) > 0 and

00(t) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Lemma 2 characterizes the complete dynamics of trust, as shown in Figure 6. From (27),
if old entrepreneurs of generation t  1 expect t > 12 and exert the educational eﬀort fs(t)
given by (26), the condition t =  1(t 1) > 12 must hold. Given that 
 1 is increasing in
t, the current level of trust t 1 must be suﬃciently high such that t 1 > 
 
1
2
   > 0.
Moreover, if  < 1
2
, or
1  2

+ bG < pR  2(I   C); (30)
then the dynamic equation under the strong enforcement regime leads to a unique steady
state at which the level of trust is such that s = (s).
(27) also implies that if old entrepreneurs of generation t   1 expect t  12 and exert
the educational eﬀort fw(t) given by (26), the dynamics change depending on certain pa-
rameters. When  < I bG
pR bG and the expected level of trust t is in the range
h
; I b
G
pR bG

, the
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condition t = 
 1(t 1)  12 must hold.15 16 Given that 
 1 is increasing in t, the current
level of trust t 1 must be suﬃciently low such that t 1  min


(1
2
); 1
	  . Moreover,
if   1
2
, or
2I   pR  1  2

+ bG; (31)
the dynamic equation under the weak enforcement regime yields a unique steady state at
which the level of trust is such that w = 
(w), as shown in Figure 6a. When   I bGpR bG ,
t must be  for any current level of trust t 1, and thus  is a unique steady-state level of
trust under the weak enforcement regime, as shown in Figure 6b.
The following proposition characterizes the existence of multiple steady states:
Proposition 5 Suppose that Assumptions 1–5 hold. Two steady states exist
(i) if (30) and (31) hold and  < I bG
pR bG , where the one steady-state level of trust is such
that s = (s) and the other one is such that w = 
(w); or
(ii) if (30) holds and   I bG
pR bG , where the one steady-state level of trust is such that
s = (s) and the other one is given by .
In either case, one has greater trust, stronger enforcement, lower repayment, and higher
aggregate output than the other.
Proposition 5 establishes that across these multiple steady states, there is a positive
relationship among the level of trust, quality of enforcement, degree of financial development
(measured by the cost of external financing r), and level of aggregate output. This result
is consistent with the observed variation across countries or regions, as shown in Tabellini
(2008a) and Algan and Cahuc (2014, Tables 2.6a).
These multiple steady states are due to the complementarity between trust and enforce-
ment stemming from the presence of adverse selection. Proposition 4 suggests that without
15It also must be that 
 1(t 1) < I b
G
pR bG . However, this condition is satisfied for any t 1 from Lemma 2.
16When  < I b
G
pR bG , t is not in the range
h
I bG
pR bG ;
1
2
i
in equilibrium, because if old entrepreneurs expect
t 2
h
I bG
pR bG ;
1
2
i
, from (27), the condition t =   I bGpR bG must hold, which is a contradiction.
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adverse selection, old entrepreneurs’ educational eﬀort is not influenced by their expectations
about institutional quality, so that there is no interaction between trust and enforcement,
leading to a unique steady state. However, with adverse selection, the quality of enforcement
aﬀects the payoﬀs of both types of entrepreneurs; accordingly, old entrepreneurs’ educational
choice is influenced by their expectations about future enforcement quality. In a high-trust
(low-trust) steady state, old entrepreneurs anticipate that the strong (weak) enforcement
regime appears and exert a high (low) level of civic education, so that the resulting econ-
omy achieves a high (low) level of trust and supports the strong (weak) enforcement regime
through the political process.
4.5 Dynamic analysis: Transitional dynamics
Figure 6 suggests that both the initial level of trust 0 and parents’ expectations play a role
in selecting the steady state at which the economy will end up. If w  , in an economy
with the initial level of trust 0  , a unique equilibrium path converges to the steady
state represented by w, along which the weak enforcement regime persists. If s > , in
an economy with the initial level of trust 0 > , a unique equilibrium path converges to
the steady state represented by s, along which the strong enforcement regime persists. In
these situations, preconditions determine the equilibrium path and resulting steady state.
Otherwise, multiple equilibria are possible. Once t reaches the region in which both
regimes are possible, that is, (; ] when  < I bG
pR bG and (
; 1] when   I bG
pR bG , parents’
expectations determine the equilibrium path. If a parent anticipates that other parents
exert high levels of educational eﬀort so that the strong enforcement regime appears in the
next period, the parent also exerts high levels of educational eﬀort, resulting in the high-
trust economy. If, instead, a parent anticipates that other parents exert low educational
eﬀort so that the weak enforcement regime prevails in the next period, the parent also
exerts low educational eﬀort, thus leading to the low-trust economy. These results imply
that expectations matter in selecting the steady state in which the economy will eventually
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reach.
Proposition 6 Suppose that multiple steady states exist. If w  , starting from any
0  , t monotonically converges to w. If s > , starting from any 0 > , t
monotonically converges to s. Otherwise, both steady states can be reached.
Proposition 6 resonates with the empirical findings on the persistent eﬀects of historic
shocks on levels of trust, institutions, and economic development. When a positive historic
shock such as the free city-states’ experience in the Italian Middle Ages (Putnam, 1993
and Guiso et al., 2016) or a negative historic shock such as Africa’s slave trade (Nunn
and Wantchekon, 2011) influences beliefs in the trustworthiness in society, the resulting
trust persists in the long run and has long-lasting eﬀects on economic development. Our
model suggests that a historic shock that cultivates (destroys) trust is long-lasting because
it leads to strong (weak) enforcement through the political process, which in turn encourages
(discourages) the formation of trust through parental education.
La Porta et al. (1998, 2008) emphasize the influence of the legal origin on the legal
protection of investors and the degree of financial development. French civil law countries
are more likely to adopt weak legal protection and have less developed financial markets
than English common law countries. Our model helps explain this legal origin theory based
on La Porta et al.’s (2008) argument that the French civil law system embeds the beliefs
that a country needs to be concerned with private disorder, whereas a common law system
embeds the beliefs that private citizens are so peaceful that the country needs to be less
concerned with disorder. According to such a view, while the transplantation of civic law
through conquest and colonization changes peoples’ mindsets and brings about distrust in
other people, the transplantation of common law encourages the formation of trust in others.
Therefore, by interpreting the transplantation of civil (common) law as a trust-destroying
(trust-building) historic shock, we can argue that such a shock has a long-lasting eﬀect on
institutions through the political process and parents’ education choices.
Moreover, Proposition 6 has a novel empirical implication. Our finding is that whether
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trust and legal enforcement are complements or substitutes depends on the timespan. In the
long run, the economy reaches one of the steady states, showing that trust and enforcement
are complements. In the short run, however, trust and enforcement may be substitutes.
Along the adjustment path converging to the steady state w, greater trust, which allows
good entrepreneurs to obtain financing with better conditions, leads bad entrepreneurs to
weaken enforcement further and increase their rents.
4.6 Comparative statics
We first consider the eﬀect of technological change (i.e., an increase in R). Figure 7a depicts
its eﬀect on the evolution of trust. In the strong enforcement regime, the increase in R
raises the profitability of running a project and encourages parental education (26). The
steady-state level of trust s and corresponding aggregate output are higher. In the weak
enforcement regime, however, bad entrepreneurs take advantage of the beneficial eﬀects of
a higher R on good entrepreneurs by weakening enforcement, as shown in Figure 3a. The
weaker enforcement benefits bad entrepreneurs and damages good entrepreneurs, discourag-
ing educational eﬀort (26) and the formation of trust. The steady-state level of trust w then
decreases and this undermines the positive eﬀect of the increase in R on aggregate output.
Such negative impacts of technological improvement on the formation of trust are in sharp
contrast to the case without adverse selection, where a higher R always cultivates trust from
Proposition 4.
These results imply that technological progress exacerbates the level of inequality in
trust, institutions, and aggregate output between steady states. The economy that reaches
the high-trust steady state cultivates trust further, whereas the economy that ends up in the
low-trust steady state suﬀers from lower institutional quality and a more severe trust deficit.
This result may help explain why even though ideas and knowledge can spread so rapidly
that any country has access to the innovations developed in advanced countries, there is still
a large disparity between advanced and developing countries.
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Figure 7: Comparative statics in the dynamic model
Moreover, after the increase in R, the region in which the enforcement regime in the
next period depends on expectations, (; ], widens. This implies that in a narrower
range of the initial level of trust, the precondition matters in selecting the steady state in
which the economy will end up. Technological innovations increase the relative importance
of expectations over the initial condition.
Then, we consider the eﬀect of public education captured by an increase in the feeling of
guilt from cheating G or a decrease in bG. Because good parents incur a higher psychological
cost when their bad children cheat, they spend more educational eﬀort in either enforcement
regime from (26). Thus, as shown in Figure 7b, the steady-state levels of trust s and w
increase. The higher w leads to a decrease in enforcement quality in the weak enforcement
regime, although Figure 3b shows that a decrease in bG does not directly aﬀect enforcement
quality when t < I b
G
pR bG . If there is no adverse selection, these eﬀects of public education
are absent from Proposition 4.
This implies that public education might play an important role in eliminating the un-
derdevelopment trap. If the decrease in bG is suﬃciently large, the economy that has been
trapped in the low-trust steady state jumps on the path toward a high-trust steady state,
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and eventually the initial inequality between steady states vanishes.
Proposition 7 We examine the following comparative statics.
1. Suppose that R increases. s increases, and w and (w) decrease. Moreover, the
width of the region, (; ], increases.
2. Suppose that G increases, or bG decreases. s and w increase, and (w) decreases.
Proof. See Appendix D.
5 Concluding Remarks
This study examines the coevolution of trust and legal enforcement in a model of competitive
credit markets with asymmetric information. The presence of adverse selection leads civic
entrepreneurs to cross-subsidize uncivic ones, generates a conflict of interests between diﬀer-
ent types of entrepreneurs over the quality of enforcement, and influences the formation of
trust. Legal enforcement and trust may be substitutes in the short run but they are comple-
ments in the long run, leading to multiple steady states with diﬀerent levels of enforcement
quality, trust, and aggregate output. While the impact of technological improvement on
an underdeveloped economy may be dampened due to uncivic entrepreneurs’ rent-seeking,
public education has the potential to drive the economy out of the trap.
We conclude with remarks on issues not covered in any depth in this study. While
in our model, the quality of legal enforcement evolves endogenously, we do not consider
the dynamic linkage of institutional quality. However, current institutional quality could
aﬀect future institutional quality because an adjustment cost is present or the distribution
of political power changes. Such a dynamic analysis is a promising area for future research.
From a policy perspective, our model suggests that public education may be helpful
to eliminate an underdevelopment trap. However, the provision of public schooling could
be the result of a political decision. In that context, uncivic citizens that constitute the
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majority might disagree with investment in public education because they fear that this
policy increases the proportion of civic citizens and causes a shift in political power to them.
The political economy of public education is thus also an important issue for understanding
the formation of trust.
Appendix A Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. From (8) and (9), financing occurs if  is suﬃciently large such that
C  	1()  I   
 
pR  bG and C  	2()  I   pR
1   : (32)
We have 	01 < 0, 	001 = 0, 	02 =   pR I(1 )2 < 0, 	002 < 0, and lim!1	2 =  1. 	1 and 	2
cross at two points, 0 and I bG
pR bG 2

0; I
pR bG

. When  2
h
0; I b
G
pR bG
i
, we have 	2  	1.
When  2

I bG
pR bG ; 1
i
, we have 	2 < 	1.
If  < , then maxf	1;	2g > C, which implies that (32) is violated for any  , and no
financing occurs. Then, suppose   , which implies maxf	1;	2g  C. If   I bGpR bG , (32)
holds for any   () = 	2()=C. If I bGpR bG <   IpR bG , (32) holds for any   () =
	1()=C. If IpR bG < , then maxf	1;	2g < 0 so that (32) holds for any  .
Appendix B Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. For old entrepreneurs of type B, from Assumption 1 we have V BGt < V BBt and thus
fBt 1 = 0 for any period. For old entrepreneurs of type G, the optimal level of education is
given by
fGt 1 =

t

t
 
pR  bG+ (t)C   I ; (33)
from (22) and (25).
If t > 12 , (t) = 1 from (20), so that (33) becomes fs(t), where fs is increasing in t.
Because fs(1) < 1   from Assumption 5, it is shown that fs(t) < 1   for any t > 12 .
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If t  12 , combining (20) and (33) yields the eﬀort level given by fw(t). fw is positive and
decreasing in t if t < I b
G
pR bG and is zero if t  I b
G
pR bG . Here, to assure that fw(t) < 1  
for any t 2

; 1
2

, it is suﬃcient to show that fw() < 1   . This is the case because
fs(1) < 1   from Assumption 5 and
fs(1)  fw()  
1   fpR  I   (1  )(I   C)g > 0;
where the second inequality holds from Assumption 3, which implies that pR   I > I   C.
Appendix C Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. First, suppose that t > 12 . (16) can be rewritten as t 1 =
t 
fs(t)
= (t). Under
Assumption 5, we have (t) > t 1  , which implies that (1) > 1. For any t 2 [; 1),
0(t) =
2t (pR  bG)  (2t   )(I   C)
[t(pR  bG)  (I   C)]2 > 0
00(t) =
 2(I   C)[(pR  bG)  (I   C)]
[t(pR  bG)  (I   C)]3 < 0
because  >   I C
pR bG from Assumption 3 and (11). Thus, we have t = 
 1(t 1), where
 1(t 1) is increasing and convex in t 1.
Next, suppose that t  12 . If   t < I b
G
pR bG , we have fw(t) > 0, and (16) boils down
to t 1 = t fw(t) = 
(t). Because
I bG
pR bG < 1 from Assumption 1, for any t 2
h
; I b
G
pR bG

,

0(t) =
( 2t + 1 + )[I   bG   t(pR  bG)] + (t   )(1  t)(pR  bG)
[I   bG   t(pR  bG)]2
=
(1  t)[I   bG   t(pR  bG)] + (t   )(pR  I)
[I   bG   t(pR  bG)]2 > 0; (34)
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and

00(t) =
2
[I   bG   t(pR  bG)]2

pR  I + (pR  bG)

1  t + (t   )(pR  I)
I   bG   t(pR  bG)

> 0:
Thus, we have t = 
 1(t 1), where 
 1(t 1) is increasing and concave in t 1.
Otherwise, fw(t) = 0, leading to t = .
Appendix D Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. First, suppose that R increases. From Lemma 2, (t) decreases, implying that  =

 
1
2

decreases and s increases, and 
(t) increases, implying that  = min


(1
2
); 1
	
increases or does not change. It is also shown that w decreases; totally diﬀerentiating
w = 
(w) with respect to w and R yields
@w
@R
=  @
(w)
@R
1

0(w)  1
=
 wp(1  w)(w   )
(1  w)[I   bG   w(pR  bG)] + (w   )(pR  I)  [I   bG   w(pR  bG)]2
=
 wp
(1  w)=(2w) + (pR  I)=(1  w)
< 0; (35)
where the second equality is derived from (34) and the third equality is derived from the
definition that w = 
(w). From (20) and (35), we also have
@(w)
@R
=
@
@R

I   wpR
C(1  w)

=
pw
C(1  w)

 1  pR  I
(1  w)wp
@w
@R

=
pw
C(1  w)

 1 + 
2
w(pR  I)
(1  w)2 + 2w(pR  I)

< 0:
Then, suppose that G increases, that is, bG decreases. From (28) and Lemma 2, (t)
decreases and s increases. From (29) and Lemma 2, 
(t) decreases and w increases. It is
also shown that (w) decreases because from (20) (w) = I wpRC(1 w) is decreasing in w.
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